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Not One of My Moments 
Sarah Wood 
Abstract 
This essay imagines Derrida by starting from the first page of Glas²read in terms of 
H[WLQFWLRQDQGJOREDOZDUPLQJ2QWKDWSDJHZHFRPHDFURVVWKHLPSHUDWLYHµVWD\DQG
WKLQN¶DQGWKHUHVWRIWKHSLHFHDGGUHVses the condensations and displacements by which that 
staying and thinking are imagined and enacted. An unimaginable ecological crisis faces us 
today. Hearing, dreaming, and reading emerge from Glas as distinctively strange and 
necessary forms of agency that can sustain our efforts to think (and act) non-destructively in 
response. 
* 
µreste à penser¶1 
Jacques Derrida 1974, 7ai. 
µ,W¶Van imperative¶2 
Hélène Cixous, Leeds 2007. 
µWe may say without qualification that 
nothing great has been accomplished 
in the world without passion¶ 
G. W. F. Hegel 1975, 73. 
µIt seems too vast, you would like to 
take photographs of the Great Eastern 
Sun and keep them as a memory, rather 
than staring directly into the light¶ 
$UWLFOHKDVEHHQDFFHSWHGIRUSXEOLFDWLRQE\(GLQEXUJK8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVLQWKH-RXUQDO'HUULGD7RGD\
 Chögyam Trungpa 1988, 67.  
 
There iVQRµDIWHU¶ reading: not in the sense of getting over something. You dream of 
writing the history, the back-story, working out the relationship of certain particles of 
writing or streaks of writing-agency. They appear, but resist coming to rest. They trouble 
the words and sentences that are to hand and remain obstinately unsynchronised. Their 
image²we are here to imagine Derrida±±stays you, it holds you up, even returns, but does 
not stay to answer. Something more is required, another agency and another conception of 
action. We will find it in accounts of reading in and about 'HUULGD¶VGlas, in dreams and at 
work in life. That is to say, we cannot finally find it, though it can be experienced and 
something can come of it.  
 This is a piece about reading Glas, written in an age of global warming and 
disappearance of ice, when the Imperial Eagle is officially identified as vulnerable to 
extinction (see Carson and Peterson 2016, and IUCN Red List 2016),W¶VPRUHWKDQWLPH²
LW¶VLPSHUDWLYH²to find new rhythms between the proverbial coldness of reason, and 
reading, understood here as a mobilising UHVSRQVLYHQHVVWKDW¶VQRWQHFHVVDULO\KXPDQRU
even recognisably alive. The processes of condensation and displacement that characterise 
the inventive forces of imagination, at its wildest and strongest in dreams, are also 
movements indispensable to thinking (see Bersani 1977, 47). 6LQFH'HUULGD¶VGHDWKLQ
there have been an increasing number of developments in and around deconstruction that 
respond to global warming, mass extinction and other forms of environmental trouble.3 This 
is a piece about Glas, a text that investigates the imperative in general, partly and crucially 
by means of articulating and responding to imperatives. Glas has been described as an 
effort to think about µwhat underlies the formation of categorical imperatives, to examine 
the necessity that compels us to generate and rely on imperatives, to interrogate just what it 
is that commands, that calls, for assent and obedience¶/XNDFKHU1987, 1199). Glas also 
thinks about and reads in terms of heat and cold, solid ice and running water. There iVQ¶W
time not to read, so better get started: µ²Allez¶ (Derrida 1974, 235b)  
 
Instead of Reading Glas, I Talked on the Phone 
I was walking along talking to my elder daughter on the mobile, fretting about the bit of the 
first page of Glas where there is an eagle caught in the ice; LW¶VFDXJKWXSLQ+HJHO¶VQDPH
in philosophy, partly on account of the sound. Hegel, aigle, eagle, [ܭܳO]. A bird caught, one 
wants it to be free, I told her. But the ice is melting. Now we know it is not good for the 
 things in the ice to be free. We need ice as such. And birds are going extinct, this is a fact.4 
In Glas iW¶VQRWQHFHVVDULO\DQDFWXDOELUGLW¶VDOVRDQLPSHULDOHDJOH²this gets very 
FRQGHQVHGRQHPLJKWVD\µFRQFHQWUDWHGDWDVLQJOHSRLQW¶ (Pinkard 2000, 228)5²the 
symbol of the Prussian state, from the Holy Roman Empire and imperial Rome and going 
forward to Emperor Napoleon and so on. We also need birds as such, including eagles, that 
was understood. 




 We moved on. 
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Recollected Derrida 
I hurried to catch up. I never did: no one ever could. Still, OHW¶VLPDJLQHthat a long time ago 
I wrote something about not reading the first page of Glas, for a symposium at Kolding in 
Denmark, and Derrida read it.6 And so on for many years until the recent dream called 
 
Meadow Remodelled 
Unrecognisable; in the distance a huge road swept across to the ancient building that I 
knew. Cars: replete with cars. The space in which across which I had wandered was divided 
allotted or allotmented in particular it pained me to see the purple iris or flags growing now 
all one length in a rectangle, crowded together like pupils and the whole space in which I 
had lived immersed now seen a little from above was finite, not so large, unrecognisable 
apart from some traces, like the colour of the flowers, the memory of a river that once had 
banks now an artificial ribbon on a map and I had let this happen I had not prevented it I 
had looked elsewhere and the beautiful disorganisation of the structure had been destroyed. 
From everywhere I could hear cars, the road, from a single vantage point I could see it all.
  traces I could smell here or there were heartbreaking especially the attempts to 
preserve a vague faded greenness here and here for example. It was contracted, torn open to 
view, hopeless. Hopelessly simple. Horror 
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Hunted on the Internet For a Glas Swan  
I found official published UHFRJQLWLRQRI0DOODUPp¶Vswan as a poetic precursor to the eagle 
FDXJKWLQµglace et gel¶RQWKHILUVWSDJHRIGlas, LQ1HG/XNDFKHU¶VIDQWDVWLF1987 review 
 in Modern Language Notes. Lukacher says pretty much everything necessary, including 
that µthe greatest risk Derrida runs in Glas is that of not being read¶ (Lukacher 1987, 1200). 
Lukacher formulates the energetic substance of Glas as follows: 
 
 The icy abstractions of Hegel's grand style, the frigid distance of what Bataille 
 called  Genet's "cold bad taste," will make Glas for many American readers the 
 scholarly equivalent of the big chill. Heat and cold are not only terms to 
 describe the reception of Glas, they are also the fundamental terms to 
 describe the specific operation of the  law of stricture in Hegel and Genet. It is the 
 great achievement of Glas that it locates the heat within the glacial oeuvres of 
 Hegel and Genet, the heat that is surreptitiously circulated, concealed, 
 displaced, and the hydraulics of narcissistic desire that seeks to erect, to 
 monumentalize the self within the crypt of language. (Lukacher 1987, 1200) 
 
In this account Glas locates what remains also unlocatable, because it is circulated, 
concealed, displaced and so on. Glas also takes on the movements of narcissistic desire as it 
ingeniously and indefatigably moves in on language with identifications that are bolder, 
more unexpected and more sustained than are, shall we say, usual. This action of 
identification and narcissistic opening is needed to think, and especially to think about and 
with the weird displacements and obscure coagulations of agency that have got earth to the 
point where the number of wild animals has halved in the last 40 years and the movement to 
a catastrophic man-made change in global temperatures continues.7 
 So, the swan, 0DOODUPp¶Vbird is sentient: µ+LVQHFNZLOOVKDNHRIIWKH white agony 
space / Inflicted upon the bird for his denial, / But not this horror of earth where his wings 
are caught [Tout son col secouera cette blanche agonie / Par l'espace infligée a l'oiseau qui 
nie, / Mais non l'horreur du sol ou le plumage est pris]¶ (Mallarmé 1982, 44-7). Once you 
have heard of and heard this suffering of the swan, QRPDWWHUWKDWLWLVQRWµUHDO¶ you cannot 
be deaf to the horror undergone by the eagle caught in the ice'RHVQ¶Wreal 
acknowledgement of one agony involve an action that virtually includes the life of all 
agonies: the living and the non-living, the swans and the eagles, the bird Poetry and the bird 
Philosophy? Imaginative action mobilises and activates. µAgony¶ and µaction¶ are 
axiomatically connected through the proto-Indo-European root *ag-, meDQLQJµWRGULYHWR
draw out or forth, to move¶ µ$[LRP¶ the statement of self-evident truth, itself comes from 
the same root, via Greek axioma µDXWKRULW\¶ OLWHUDOO\µWKDWZKLFKLVWKRXJKWZRUWK\RUILW¶ 
 from axios µZRUWK\ZRUWKRIOLNHYDOXHZHLJKLQg as much¶ from the proto-Indo-European 
adjective *ag-ty-o- µZHLJKW\¶ Extinction and global warming are worth thinking about, no? 
They are subjects of gravity and significance. And thinking is what weighs, penser from 
Latin pensare, to weigh or consider.  
 There is a gl of Glas, it is well known, the glottal action of swallowing and not 
swallowing that closes off the circulating resonances and endless reading possibilities (see 
Lukacher 1987, 1200). Gl makes possible the hydraulics of narcissistic desire. There is also 
ag, a sound like ach, ack or agh, or *HQHW¶V MHP¶pF, that calls to mind gagging or choking. 
7RJDJVRPHRQHWUDQVLWLYHO\LVWRVWRSWKHLUPRXWKE\WKUXVWLQJVRPHWKLQJLQWRLW%XWLW¶V
not clear that thinking is transitive (Wood 2014, 29-30). No matter how heavy or light the 
material thinking takes on may be, how do you know, in the end, what you are thinking 
about, or whether you are thinking at all? There is always a funny kind of emptiness about 
thinking. The action or agony of ag, drive, drawing out, drawing forth, or movement is 
unilateral, not because it is subjective²subjective opposed to what, exactly?²but because 
it is not guaranteed to be in relation to anyone or anything at all in particular. (The risk 
Derrida takes in Glas is of not being read, Lukacher remarks.)  
 ,¶YHEHHQWKLQNLQJDERXWHxtinction: half the so-called animals are extinct and the 
human species is not exempt from the same pressures of heating, melting, unflushable 
dumping of inassimilable poisons and other environmental destructions, extractions and 
overloads that have got people thinking about relocating to Mars or putting an elite on ice 
for the far future when things might look more promising.8 What the first page of Glas once 
seemed to offer readers was the chance to think in the context of the oeuvre, narcissistic 
desire and the self. µ)RUXVKHUHQRZ: from now on that is what one will not have been able 
to think without him [3RXUQRXVLFLPDLQWHQDQWYRLOjFHTX¶RQQ¶DXUDSXGpVRUPDLV
penser sans lui]¶ (Derrida 1986b, 1a/1974 7a). But how are we to stay and think these days, 
when heat is on the loose and extinction needs to be recognised as something other than 
death? Death, which has quietly or clumsily organised our thinking all this time, now seems 
by contrast quite palatable. 
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Read Hillis Miller Reading Glas  
The most recent commentary on the first page of Glas is by Hillis Miller. His work has in 
recent years been notable for developing relations between deconstructive thinking and 
awareness of the irreversible global effects of climate change (see Miller 2010, 2011 and 
2016). Miller¶VUHDGLQJRIGlas does not take up the environmental theme in any very 
 explicit way. He can, however, be said to be imagining Derrida, and Glas. Compared with 
more austere deconstructive readings like Lukacher¶V or Andrej Warminski¶V,9 0LOOHU¶V
essay recuperates reading Glas into intersubjective, subject-and-object, autobiographical 
and anecdotal (albeit somewhat traumatic) experience. µ,nterior iPDJHV¶is a key term and 
the text includes a number of images of his personal copy of the book: the cover, the title 
page with a dedication from Derrida, the SULqUHG¶LQVpUHU with a corner missing, and a shot 
of the opening page. Taking up Keatsian idiom, Miller UHWXUQVWRKLVILUVWµORRNLQJLQWR¶
Glas in 1974, when it seemed to him verily DµQHZSODQHW¶ (Miller 2016b, 133). Exploring 
that planet is an almighty effort,  
 in addition to trying to make sense of the words on the page, all sorts of somatic 
 and affective responses were involved, as well as a constant unsuccessful attempt 
 to create a coherent mental image based not only on the way the words are  
 arranged on the page (in two columns), but also on the bewildering complexity of 
 what the words say. (Ibid., 129) 
The essay is full of insight and learning, to the point of being an indispensable exegesis. It 
also documents the failure of its own drive to make or find a coherent mental image for 
reading the book. What it does come up with by the end is µa composite image, a collage or 
montage, of a pile of debris such as you might find in the town dump or in a garbage can or 
in a waste basket¶ (Ibid., 146). As he puts it elsewhere²not in relation to Glas but with 
something of the same exhausted lucidity²we are µcollectively living on a planet that is 
becoming one gigantic garbage dump¶ (Miller 2016a, 187). 0LOOHU¶VµKHURLFDQGRQWKH
whole unsuccessful attempt to figure out just what Derrida is saying, just what the words 
PHDQ¶ (Miller 2016b, 139) ends with a pile consisting 
 of faeces; of a Rembrandt torn into regular squares; of the works of Hegel 
 VLPLODUO\IUDJPHQWHGRIDGHDGERG\'HUULGD¶VRZQKHZDVREVHVVHGZLWKWKH
 question of his own remains, in all senses, including his unpublished 
 manuscripts); of a fragmented poster of an imperial German eagle; of debris 
 falling and then rising again as a tower and simultaneously as a colossus. (Ibid., 
 146)  
Miller arranges Glas as an image of disarray and derangement. Nothing in the waste basket 
is moving or animated. The essay composes the oeuvre, the book, the page and format, the 
 3ft tower of proofs from Galilée in relation to a discreet, restrained and somewhat objective 
pathos of reading and failing to read.  
 Glas also describes the relation between reading and writing from the point of view of 
living, if not personal, experience. The experience is both immersive and partial and cannot 
EHIXOO\DFFRXQWHGIRUE\DFULWLFDOQDUUDWLYHRUDUJXPHQWEHFDXVHLWLVµVWUXFWXUDOO\
LQWHUPLQDEOH¶ a living animal language-body is endlessly caught in what it tries to write its 
way clear of (Derrida 1974, 130bl; .1986b, 148bi. Translation modified). Derrida describes 
an agonyWKHµDJRQ\RIPHWDODQJXDJH¶ an anguish or terror WKDWLVµVWUXFWXUDOO\
interminable. But as effort and effect. Metalanguage is the life of language: it always beats 
its wings like a bird caught in a subtle glue¶ We are in the agony of extinction. This is a 
living horror on a scale we cannot contemplate. We need not images and pathos, but the 
argh, aggro and urgency of dreams and writing-agency that can articulate, render thinkable, 
the agony of imagining. 
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Heard Cixous Speak Two or Three Words From the Other 
Side 
Until I heard Hélène Cixous (2007) UHWUDQVODWHµreste à penser¶ the phrase that begins the 
second insert, judas or jalousie set into the left side of the left hand column of the first page 
of Glas, ,¶GKDGQRLGHDWKDW it might not mean, as the English translation haVLWµUHPDLQV
to be thought¶ I thought (if it can be called thinking, that was so unthinking) that the phrase 





 remain(s) to be thought: it (ça) does not accentuate itself here now but will 
 already have been put to the test on the other side. Sense must conform, more or 
 less, to the calculi of what the engraver terms a counterproof. (Derrida 1974ai; 
 1986b, 1ai) 
  
But instead OHW¶V respond to the imperative: 
 
  µreste à penser¶  µVWD\DQGWKLQN¶ 
        (Cixous 2007) 
  
Cixous, in a couple of spoken sentences, made or let be heard a strange unlocatable 
sociability of thinking. (Following for a moment the iterations of en in the reste à penser 
insert we might say she enthought it.) 6KHVDLGµ,W¶VDQLPSHUDWLYHVWD\DQGWKLQNStay and 
think. Stay with me, read with me, think with me, live with me, die with me¶ There is a 
being-with that does not depend on full presence, or on being of the same kind, or species, 
RUEHLQJDOLYHRUGHDGRUDQLPDWHRULQDQLPDWH,WFDQ¶Wbe pointed to, cited as proof, without 
problematising all the identifications in the scene. It even troubles identification itself. She 
spoke out of, or drew forth towards us, a dream. We dream, Freud knew, with our ears. The 
phrase came forth easily. But still, it came from far away and was headed futurewards. It 
carried or was borne along by an enchantment from who knows where, call without 
provenance, nightingale to all the emperors. It worked at the level of narcissistic desire. The 
utterance reiterated and drew out the phrase. This movement of extension, with all its risks, 
is indispensable. It begins with love of language and a capacity to identify, more or less 
fearlessly, with its movements. 
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Imagined Derrida Now 
The first page of Glas points to a certain emblematic, embalmed Hegel. The model 
philosopher is preserved in the ice, fixed as he is for those who have reaGKLPµRQO\D
OLWWOH¶²IUR]HQSDOHVWLIINQRZQIRUµPDJLVWHULDOFROGQHVVDQGLPSHrWXUEDEOHVHULRXVQHVV¶ 
(Derrida 1986b, 1a). But how did he get there? The book begins mid-sentence and perhaps 
like the reader, this Hegel has at some point been thrown in and got stuck. An emblem, 
before it is an image or object that serves as the symbolic representation of an abstract 
quality, action, state of things or class of person, is something thrown in. It arrives thanks to 
outside intervention. It is an insert²from Greek emblemaµan insertion¶ from emballein, 
µto throw in¶ An emblem remains perceptibly other than the context in which it appears and 
it retains, despite having been inserted there, a certain strangeness that Derrida notices. The 
words reste à penser are also dropped into Glas, without a capital R that one would expect 
to begin a sentence. It is, like a name, aphoristic. Glas brings another way of beginning into 
sentences.  
 Cixous drew attention to reste à penser as a singular imperative and retrospectively it 
became as if someone, or something, had been speaking the words all along. She gave voice 
with confidence. It was an intervention. True confidence is confidence in nothing. She took 
intimate dictation not from Glas, not from Derrida himself but from the unlocatable place 
 WKHLQVHUWFDOOVµWKHRWKHUVLGH [O¶DXWUHF{WH]¶²a place (like the insert itself, or like a dream) 
a little to one side of the proper. This was in order to let the imperative move forward as it 
had to. We write, when we are serious, for the other side: 
 I think one also writes for the dead. ... Every name is the name of someone dead 
 or of a living someone whom it can do without. If the destination of writing is 
 names or one writes to call up names, then one writes also for the dead. Perhaps 
 not for the dead in general, ... rather one writes for a specific dead person. 




Instead of Reading Glas I Thought About Sexual Difference 
Glas thinks, and invites us to think, but does not set out to sublimate thought. Sexual 
difference comes into this. Derrida LQVLVWHGWKDWµWKHILJXUHRIWKHSKLORVRSKHUIRUPHLV
always a maVFXOLQHILJXUH¶DQGWKDWµSKLORVRSK\VLQFHLWVLQFHSWLRQKDVDOZD\VEHHQOLQNHG
to a paternal figure¶ (Dick and Kofman 2005, 97). The persistence of this link between 
philosophy and the father can be thought of as what happens when idealisation and 
anthropomorphic identification dominate thinking. A lineage and a tradition of thinking 
may be preserved but its movement becomes fixated in determined ways. Freud explains 
how this happens and the destructiveness and cruelty unleashed in the process: 
The super-ego arises, as we know, from an identification with the father taken as a model 
[Vatervorbild]. Every such identification is in the nature of a de-sexualisation or even of a 
sublimation. It now seems as if when a transformation of this kind takes place, an 
instinctual defusion [Triebentmischung] occurs at the same time. After sublimation the 
erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructiveness that was 
combined with it, and this is released in the form of an inclination to aggression and 
destruction. This defusion would be the source of the general character of harshness and 
cruelty exhibited by the ideal ± itVGLFWDWRULDOµ7KRXVKDOW¶ [gebieterischen Sollens] (Freud 
2001, 54-55). 
 That day at Leeds, Cixous read µreste à penser¶ very directly.10 She uttered it and 
glossed it as something other than one more academic superego injunction. There was no 
question of sublimating the erotic component of thinking. No sentiment, effigies or role 
models. The imperative to stay and think retained the irresistible intimacy of a thinking that 
dreams (that is, a thinking made up of condensations and displacements as well as 
 significations). The ça that the insert goes on to refer to is the Es or id whose passions live 
us. A passion for letters and sounds can hear and read all kinds of things in this ça by 
JacquES DerrIDa. 
 &L[RXV¶ reading-writing-thinking proves itself by seeking and affirming contact with 
what the insert goes on to call DQµRWKHUVLGH [autre côte]¶ and the otherness of this other 
side makes it more suitable to be addressed than to be taken as a model or cited as a proof. 
Love of language comes into this. You entrust yourself to a movement of thinking in which 
meaning is not an ideal given from above, nor can it be frozen, fixed, rescued or freed by 
those who know how, as one might imagine a more or less progressive history of 
philosophy working by means of a little reading, much decoding, the proper expressions of 
ridicule and the appropriate manifestations of respect. As in dreams, proper names melt²
no one owns this movement²but GRQ¶WYDQLVKHQWLUHO\What happens FDQ¶WEHrecognised 
and greeted properly without some reference to the order of names. It emerges that the 
conformity in the English µ[s]ense PXVWFRQIRUP¶feels rather too harsh and super-egoish, 
too unresponsive, as a WUDQVODWLRQRI'HUULGD¶Vµsens doit répondre¶  
 The heated calculation of writing cannot be extracted from a movement of reading to 
become an authority. The counter-proof is not another kind of philosophical proof, nor a 
polemical intervention. The term counter-proof comes from printmaking, where what 
matters is not the transmission of meaning but the transferability of marks from one surface 
to another²µUHDGLQJ¶LQWKHPRVWPHFKDQLFDOVHQVH.11 French sensµPHDQLQJ¶ is also 
sentience, sensory perception, instinct, direction, the responsiveness of the reader-writer to 
an other within themselves. A lot of this goes on in the ear, where a host of sons, sounds 
(not sons-of-the-father) accompany sens, unworried by the kind of contradiction Derrida 
notes between the phonically similar operations of a text letting itself be assigned 
(enseigner, also µtaught¶) and signed, signer. And while we are taking up the invitation 
issued by the first pages of Glas to restore eros to Hegel by reading him and especially by 
reading his name, ,¶Glike to add that although in French the ornithological eagle, like the 
eagle-lectern of the academic, is a noun gendered masculine, the military and heraldic aigle, 
the emblem or ensign that would lend LWVµLPSHULDORUKLVWRULFSRZHU¶WR+HJHO¶VQDPH, 
takes the feminine. Thinking is neither masculine nor feminine and can be either masculine 
or feminine or maybe both, depending. 
 
µWhat Actually HDSSHQV¶ 
In his essay on Glas Hillis Miller finds  
  
 that what actually happens when I read a poem, a novel, a philosophical text or a 
 critical text is the spontaneous generation of a quite definite imaginary space 
 with appropriate feelings as well as a visual vividness not entirely justified by 
 the words on the page. Glas is no exception. (Miller 2016b, 139) 
 
µ6pontaneity¶ and µgeneration¶ can never be the same after reading Glas. This could be 
demonstrated in terms of the OHIWKDQGFROXPQ¶V account of µKHUHDQGnow¶ starting at the 
top of the first page, and from its discussion RIWKHIDPLO\DQGµWKHJHQHULFSURFHVV¶LQ
Hegel.12 It is also true that reading Glas is a very intense experience of reading-
transferences and enactments. Something accentuates itself, in you. You get caught up in, 
become an effect of counterproofing, new-editioning or transference. You take an 
impression from the other side, quickly, quickly before the writing has dried into sentences, 
RUWKHVHQWHQFHVFRQJHDOHGLQWRSDUDJUDSKLFDUJXPHQWV<RXORRNLQWR\RXUVHOI:KDW¶V
happening, how did it touch you? What happened there? This makes Glas a particularly 
suitable work to study in this age of what Timothy Morton excellently calls µglobal 
weirding¶ (Morton 2016, 5-12). 
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Had a Laugh 
Glas is an exhibition of word-things,QGUHDPV)UHXGVD\VµZRUGVand names [Worte und 
Namen] are frequently treated ... as though they were things, and for that reason they are apt 
to be combined in just the same way as are representations of things. Dreams of this kind 
offer the most amusing and curious neologisms [komische und seltsame Wortschöpfungen]¶ 
(Freud 2001, 295-6; 1900, 301). Lyotard calls these comical strange creations or 
condensations mots-choses or µZRUG-things¶ (Lyotard 2011, 239). A word-WKLQJLVµRSDTXH 
dense, hiding its other side(s)¶ $QDXUDRIµPDJLVWHULDOFROGQHVVDQGLPSHUWXUEDEOH
VHULRXVQHVV¶SHUVLVWVDURXQGWKLQNLQJDQGLQWHUIHUHVZLWKLWKDSSHQLQJ%XWLQDQLQVHUWODWHU
in Glas µDERXWZKLFK¶'HUULGDDGGVµRQHGRHVQRWNQRZLILWZRUNV¶.LHUNegaard insists: 
µ+HJHODQG+HJHOLDQLVPFRQVWLWXWHDQHVVD\LQWKHFRPLFDO¶ (Derrida 1986b, 232ai). Tom 
Cohen has repeatedly called for a new climate comedy, often associated with a taste for 
aporia and the vivid sense of the fatuity of recuperating the unthinkable that has already 
happened (Cohen 2016, 21-22; 26-28; 31; 62). Timothy Morton¶VFRPLFVSLULWLVSHUKDSV
FORVHUWRWKHµLQILQLWHFLUFXODWLRQRIJHQHUDOHTXLYDOHQFH¶WKDWWURXEOHV and inspires Glas. He 
 suggests that comedy has an important relation to the anarchic and the need to remove of 
what he calls philosophical copyright control on access to reality: 
 
$QGRQFH\RXJHWULGRIWKHFRS\ULJKWFRQWURODQGRQFH\RXJHWULGRI.DQW¶V
nervous restriction on what access means; access for him is mathematizing 
philosophy, like everything is just extension and so if I know things 
mathematically I know them extensionally, right? If you take that away and, you 
NQRZDUDLQGURSWRXFKLQJPH,¶PDOVRDFFHVVLQJLW,¶PKDYLQJDIHHOLQJDERXW
LWWKDW¶VDOVRDFFHVsing it. So if you take that away and you take the 
anthropocentric block, inhibition, away, what you get is that everything in the 
universe gets to access everything else, and the way that everything accesses 
everything is such that nothing is ever exhausted, everything is always 
completely sparkling with some kind of unfathomable, vivid, bristly reality, you 
NQRZ"$QGXOWLPDWHO\WKDW¶VIXQQ\LW¶VOLNHLW¶VDFRPHG\LW¶VQRWDWUDJHG\LW¶V
not horrific. (Morton and Obrist 2017, online) 
 
Glas also carries traces of a silent activity, still minus a name, glimpsed in word-fragments 
and mute words, even working across what look like sentences. A name can exhibit and 
hide µunheard-of, monstrous species of things¶ (Saussure qtd in de Man 1986, 37). Genet 
had an interesting line on literature as a kind of originary commentary on what is not to be 
said aloud or made explicit. For him, writing can be seen as a parade devoted to an absent 
word. Derrida describes in Glas the procedure of writing that avoids the explicit in order to 
bring about a specific writing-action without mastery. It takes the form of a kind of writing 
ZLWKRXWZULWLQJ,WFRPPHQWVµZLWKRXWHYHUZULWLQJHYHUSURQRXQFLQJZKDW\RXDUH
nevertheless constrained to understand, on one scene or the other, and what, consequently, 
strikes much more strongly, so as not to be mastered in an act¶ (Derrida 1986b, 128-29bi; 
1974, 147b). Everyone has come to the games to watch the struggle of an agon, a mental 
fight or a death-struggle to imagine Derrida or imagine extinction and what you get is 
parade or parrying-actions, the movements of drawing something out, or gathering-together. 
Still, even here, you might chance upon²not the thing itself²EXWµWKHPDGHQHUJ\RIa 
gift¶ (Derrida 1986b, 243a).  
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Went to the Dictionaries 
 Sa accentuates itself, and it can do so without me. For example the reflexive verb 
s¶DFFHQWXHU: µLW>ça] does not accentuate itself [V¶DFFHQWXHU] here now but will already have 
been put to the test on the other side. Sense must respond, more or less, to the calculi of 
what the engraver terms a counterproof¶ The reflexive form of accentuer has to do with 
marking and re-marking. 6¶DFFHQWXHU suggests a kind of passive emergence into, or increase 
of perceptibility, that builds over time. Harrap gives us the following meanings: 
 
x (contrast, resemblance) to become more marked, or apparent or pronounced;  
x (tendency) to become more noticeable;  
x (unemployment) to rise, to increase;  
x (crisis) to increase in intensity.  
 
Dictionaries can ramp things up rather than settle them. 
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Read Freud, The Ego and the Id 
6¶DFFHQWXHU, a French sound, begins V¶D, which sounds like çaµWKLVLW¶ this demonstrative 
pronoun, the name of the thing we are trying to think or think about, whatever it may be, 
here and now. FreuG¶VDFFRXQWRIwhat is called the id (or ça or Es) says that µZKDWZHFDOO
RXUHJREHKDYHVHVVHQWLDOO\SDVVLYHO\LQOLIHDQGZHDUH³OLYHG´E\XQNQRZQDQG
uncontrollable forces¶ (Freud 2001b, 23). µ:H shall now look upon an individual as a 
psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego¶ (Ibid., 24). The 
ego seeks to promote the influence of the things it has been modified byµexternal reality¶ 
perceptual experience and µcommon sense¶ (Ibid., 25). The ego is a keen learner. It may 
want to check and steer the id, but still remains part of it, is derived from it, and takes its 
energy from it. The psychical parts here are more than a single whole, as Timothy Morton 
might say. The id remains impervious to external reality, perceptual experience and 
common sense. And yet, what Derrida says about ça and the counterproof suggests the id 
reads. Dreams are further evidence that the id can read. 
 As we have seen, in Glas sa is shorthand for savoir absolu, Absolute Knowlege, 
+HJHO¶Vchallenge to the notion that philosophical understanding can be reached bit by bit in 
an accumulation of particulars. According to the account of philosophy in the Preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spiritµa mutuDOQHFHVVLW\¶RIDSSDUHQWO\FRQIOLFWLQJPRPHQWVµDORQH
constitutes the life of the whole¶ (Hegel 1977, 2). To understand a philosophical system it is 
 therefore important to recognise the unity of µUHFLSURFDOO\QHFHVVDU\PRPHQWVWKDWWDNH
shape as a conflict and seeming incompatibility¶. Hegel and Freud both insist on the 
superficiality of perception, external reality and common sense as measures of the truth. 
They invite us to read, for the sake of the system.    
 But something else also accentuates itself. It makes another kind of overture. 
Accentuer and V¶DFFHQWXHU are derived from Latin accentus, a song added to speech. Ad, 
before + cantus, a singing. You cannot write about this, beyond the odd remark, a bit of 
earth scattered as you run. To quote Dissemination DJDLQµpointing out a single thematic 
nucleus or a single guiding thesis, [...] would cancel out the textual displacement that is at 
ZRUN³KHUH´ (Here? Where? The question of the here and now is explicitly enacted in 
dissemination)¶ (Derrida 1981, 7). At times one must refrain from posting signs, shaping 
arguments, or gathering thinking into the Thoughts of I. This is in order to hear. One gets 
access to the precise effects and workings of the primary process through the ear. 
 According to The Ego and the Id, when we hear language we hear²rHPDLQVµ,Q
essence a word is after all the mnemic residue [Erinnerungsrest] of a word that has been 
heard¶ (Freud 2001b, 21). Discussing the strange diagram of the psyche he seems to have 
first put to paper in a letter to Georg Groddeck, now re-appearing in print, Freud draws 
special attention to the importance of sounds. The ego µZHDUVD³FDSRIKHDULQJ´²on one 
side only, as we learn from cerebral anatomy. It might be said to wear it awry¶ (Ibid., 25). 
This means that when we think we hear straight, by the rules of the signification system, a 
VRXQGWKDWFDUULHVDPHDQLQJDZRUGDVHQWHQFHQRSUREOHP,JHWLWZH¶UHQRWUHDOO\
KHDULQJDWDOO:H¶UHHGLWLQJRXWZKDWDFFHQWXDWHVLWVHOIAnd, in the )UHXG¶Vimage of hte 
psyche, the ego itself perches on top of and rises out of the energies of a mischievous, 
incoherent, pleasure-led id. What is us? Are we ever all here? Together now? How much of 
what follows here is, necessarily, a repetition of the displacement that constitutes and 
deconstructs egoic space? ,GRQ¶WNQRZ: reading Glas means translating from an unknown 
language, we might call it Eaglish, without prior knowledge of the grammar or the lexicon.  
 
Instead of Reading Glas I Read Genet 
The µinfinite circulation of a general equivalence¶ as the first page of Glas describes it, is 
not restricted to the columns of Glas, or to language, or to abstract thought. According to 
What Remains of a Rembrandt ...., it passes even through the µIL[HGEXWQRWJD]HOHVV¶ eyes 
of butchered sheep-heads (Genet 1968, 27). Genet describes the direct experience of an 
µLPPHGLDWHFHUWDLQW\¶about himself and a fellow train-passenger: the knowledge WKDWµHDFK-
 other were only one, both either he or I and he and I¶ (Ibid., 19). The iQVLJKWWKDWµHYHU\
man iVDOOWKHRWKHUV¶LVQRWWKHRU\SKLORVRSK\RUUHOLJLRQEXWVRPHWKLQJµGUHDPHGUDWKHU
than thought¶ (Ibid., 21; 22). Everyday impressions of separate existences and species, or of 
categorical separation between living and dead entities, have become a series of mysteries 
to be explained.  
 A proper name, classically speaking, has a referent but no signified. Glas invites us to 
consider the challenge and stake [enjeu] of literary discourse DVµWKHSDWLHQWFUDIW\TXDVL-
animal or vegetable, untiring, monumental, derisory too, but on the whole holding itself up 
WRGHULVLRQWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIKLV>*HQHW¶V@SURSHUQDPHrebus, into things, into the name of 
things¶ (Derrida 1986b, 5b; 1974, 11b). His proper name, not the proper name²someone¶V
name becoming no-RQH¶VQDPHand back again is not something to be entrusted to the gelid 
discursiveness of theory. But then again, what is the process that names the game of 
literature? What is the name of the process? Who can speak about it? One might trust a 
Genet to carry off this writing-metamorphosis²EXWLW¶Valso well known that writers GRQ¶W
always necessarily care to EORZWKHJDIIµ,GRZKDW,GRQRWVD\DOPRVW,QHYHUVD\ZKDW,
do¶ (Derrida 1986b, 227b) . 
  
Instead of Reading Glas ,5HDGµ+\SRJUDPDQG,QVFULSWLRQ¶E\3DXOGH0DQ 
De Man reminds us that the RSHQLQJRI+HJHO¶VPhenomenology, the chapter on sense-
certainty, LVµZULWWHQDOORYHUGlas¶ (De Man 1986, 41). µ+\SRJUDP¶ it is well known, is a 
WHUPFRLQHGE\6DXVVXUHLQUHVSRQVHWRµDVWURQJKXQFK¶WKDWµ/DWLQSRHWU\ZDVVWUXFWXUHG
by the coded dispersal (or dissemination) of an underlying word or proper name throughout 
the lines of verse¶ (Ibid., 36). Saussure abandoned his research because of a lack of 
historical evidence to corroborate his hunch but, mainly, de Man explains µEHFDXVHKHFRXOG
not prove whether the structures were random, the outcome of probability, or determined by 
the codification of a semiosis¶ (Ibid., 37). To observe, alone, something the existence of 
which may have no guarantee in meaning may be terrifying, as hallucination may be 
terrifying. De Man suggests that 6DXVVXUH¶VFDXWLRQ about publishing his research µsupports 
WKHDVVXPSWLRQRIDWHUURUJOLPSVHG¶ De Man emphasises the effect the discovery of 
hypograms has on the assumption that language is hospitable to even the most ingenious or 
discreet forms of narcissistic appropriation. Rather: 
 
 the phonic, sensory, and phenomenal ground of poetic diction has been unsettled, 
 for the laws for the dispersal of the key word in the text . . . are not phenomenally 
  or even mathematically perceivable. Since the key word is the proper name in all 
 its originary integrity, its subdivision into discrete parts and groups resembles, on 
 the level of meaning, the worst phantasms of dismemberment to be found in D. P. 
 6FKUHEHU¶VDenkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken [Memoirs of My Nervous 
 Illness]. We would then have witnessed . . . the undoing of the phenomenality of 
 language which always entails (since the phenomenal and the noumenal are binary 
 poles within the same system) the undoing of cognition and its replacement with 
 the uncontrollable power of the letter as inscription.(Ibid.) 
 
Writing-agency gives readers and writers no ground, no basis for confidence in themselves. 
The ±gram in µhypogram¶ re-marks the agency of the letter. To identify its scatterings under 
the regime of a name or a secreted word would shelter language (and readers) from the 
effects of a µFRJQLWLYHGLVPHPEHUPHQW¶ that nonetheless continues to threaten the very 
notion of thought. De Manian inscription suggests there is something to be read which 
cannot be identified in advance²because it has no phenomenal presence and is not 
semantically determined (being non-cognitive). It may however produce effects of 
cognition, and may give rise to mimetic and proper-name effects.  
 µ,QVFULSWLRQ¶ might be one way to WUDQVODWHµOHJHQG¶RQWKHILUVWSDJHRIGlasµ7KLV
is²a legend¶ Glas is a worst-case scenario for reading because it pushes the regressive 
possibilities RILGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKWKHQDPHDVKDUGDVLWH[SORGHVWKHQRWLRQRIWKHµSURSHU¶
and also reminds us that, as Genet puts it: µZRUGVGRQ¶WJLYHDIXFN¶ (Genet qtd in Derrida 
1986b, 233bi). One must have a certain courage to think this and not give up. But there is 
no need at this point to remain ignorant of, or be intimidated by, the agony of metalanguage 
and the indifferent agency of words. 
  
I Read Glas Badly 
We are almost at the end now. Bad reading generates lots of questions without answers: 
µwhat happHQVZKHQ+HJHO¶VWH[WLVQRWUHDGRUZKHQLWLVUHDGbadly?¶ (Derrida 1986b, 
227a) Again: µwhat is it not to read Hegel or to read him badly or rather the text Sa? . . . It is 
impossible to know if such a feint is possible¶ (Ibid., 231ai). The hypothesis of a bad 
reading, in terms of SaµKDVQRSODFH¶ (Ibid., 232ai).  
 However, towards the end of Glas, not-reading or reading badly does come back, as a 
kind of parade of reading where in fact no one is reading in the way you learn to in school 
or university, or even at your PRWKHU¶VNQHHThe text not being read is the Torah. The right 
 to Dµmore or less laboriRXVUHDGLQJRIDPRUVHORIWH[W¶is for sale to only a few privileged 
individuals (Ibid., 241bi). The scrolls of the Torah are also held up and shown to the crowd, 
in a gesture that suggests something obviously inauthentic, impossible and unrealistic: as if 
they too µFRXOGUHDGOHDUQYHULO\SXUFKDVHDWsuch a great distance, a book²the first²that 
was thick, dense, difficult, heavy, unaccented¶ Derrida told us at Kolding that he saw this 
ceremony himself as a child in Algeria. What happens next happens without what is 
classically recognised as reading. In Glas this reading without reading takes the form of 
witnessing the pageantry, and then dreaming about it: 
 
Maybe the children who watched the pomp of this celebration, even more than 
those who could lend it a hand, dream about it for a long time after, in order to 
organize all the pieces and scenes of their lives [pour y agencer toutes les pièces 
de leur vie].(Derrida 1986b, 241b; 1974, 269bi)  
 
Dreaming carries strange agency'HUULGD¶VGUHDP-work differs from )UHXG¶V in its lack of 
undue emphasis on analysis, interpretation or the making-explicit RIDGUHDPHU¶VZLVK. The 
composition or agencement of Glas takes condensation and displacement out of the 
hierarchical opposition conscious / unconscious that tends to dominate psychoanalysis. 
Derrida values and trusts the effects of processes of condensation and displacement over 
theoretical certainty and systematic coherence. He is ready to hold off interpretation as 
sense-making. He does not offer the kind of analysis that aims at identifying something 
already established for waking thought. µAgencer¶PLJKWEHWUDQVODWHGLQYDULRXVZD\VWR
put together, to organize, order, harmonise, construct, to lay out or arrange²a museum, a 
room, the scenes of a pageant or play, a sentenceRUSLHFHVRIRQH¶VOLIH. It is a word with a 
future. It has all sorts of things in it that are necessary to reckon with ecological reality, a 
reality that includes global warming with its dialectic-defying scalar disjunctions in time 
and space and its effects and causes that are too many and too complex to remain within the 
remit of any one field or discipline. <RXFDQ¶Wyet imagine but you can condense and 
displace. Your thinking can be overdetermined and subject to shifts. You can be driven, 
subject to drawings-out and drawings-forth. You can enact. You can begin to be moved, 
including being moved to become interested by and passionate about precisely what you 
structurally and empirically cannot think, such as for example the thought of extinction. 
  
To be continued 
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 Very grateful thanks to Sarah Dillon and John Schad for the chance to be part of the 
original and inspiring Imagining Derrida event and this special issue, also to Forbes 
Morlock, Rose Wood and Nicole Anderson. 
2
 Public comment, glosVLQJµreste à penser¶ from the opening page of Glas, at Hélène 
Cixous, Jacques Derrida: Their Psychoanalyses, a Critical Consciousness 
symposium, Leeds, 1-3 June 2007. 
3
 Timothy Clark comes to mind, also inspiring work by Timothy Morton, and Tom 
Cohen, Claire Colebrook, Hillis Miller and other authors at the Open Humanities 
Press. They think about the effects passing between climate crisis and deconstruction, 
as well as thinking about what is happening to and on the planet in ways that include, 
but are not restricted to, what is known as deconstruction. They have cottoned on to 
being inspired by what many of us still tend to disavow. 
4
 For example, according to the authors of 7KH6WDWHRIWKH8.¶V%LUGV,  
although the small population of Golden Eagles in Scotland (they are now no longer 
found in England) has increased by 15% since 2003, PRUHWKDQDTXDUWHURIWKH8.¶V
bird species now PHHWRQHRIWKHIROORZLQJFULWHULDµWKH\DUHFRQVLGHUHGDWWKUHDWRI
global extinction, they have shown severe historical (since 1800) decline in the UK, 
without subsequent recovery, or they have shown severe (greater than 50%) 
population decline or range contraction, over the last 25 years or a longer-term period 
VWUHWFKLQJEDFNWR¶6DQG\%HGIRUGVKLUH563%%72:WT, DAERA, JNCC, 
NE, NRW and SNH, 2017). 
5
 Recall if you will +HJHO¶VIDPRXVGHVFULSWLRQRI1DSROHRQEHIRUHWKHEDWWOHRI-HQD
µ,VDZWKH(PSHURU²this world-spirit²riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is 
indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated 
[konzentriert] here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and 
masters it WKLVH[WUDRUGLQDU\PDQZKRPLWLVLPSRVVLEOHQRWWRDGPLUH¶(Pinkard 
2000, 228). 
                                                                                                                         
6
 µGlossing Glas¶, University of South Denmark, 24-26 May 2001. 
7
 See https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/29/earth-lost-50-wildlife-
in-40-years-wwf  and http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-guide/climate-
change/impacts/four-degree-rise (accessed 19 May 2017).  
8
 The latest µLiving Planet Report¶ by the World Wildlife Fund highlights a global 
/LYLQJ3ODQHW,QGH[ZKLFKLQVKRZHGµDGHFOLQHEHWZHHQDQG
This means that, on average, animal populations are roughly half the size they were 
42 years ago¶McRae, R. et al., 2016). If this worries you, and you have a lot of 
money, the Cryonics Institute of Clinton Township Michigan, USA invites you to: 
µLPDJLQHDZRUOGIUHHRIGLVHDVHGHDWKDQGDJLQJ$WWKH&U\RQLFV,QVWLWXWHZH
believe that day is inevitably coming and cryonics is presently our best chance of 
getting there. Our mission is to extend human lifespans by preserving the body using 
existing cryogenic technologies ± with the goal of revival by future science. But will 
it work? Research makes a powerful case for cryonics. Get the facts and decide for 
\RXUVHOI¶http://www.cryonics.org/ (accessed 07 May 2017). 
9See the reading of the beginning of Glas LQµ5HDGLQJ)RU([DPSOH³6HQVH-
&HUWDLQW\´LQ+HJHO¶VPhenomenology of Spirit¶LQ Warminski 198, pp. 164-5. 
10
 Most of the talks are collected in Paragraph 36: 2 µ&L[RXV'HUULGD
3V\FKRDQDO\VLV¶6HHDOVRµ5HDGLQJ0DWWHUV¶ in Wood 2016, pp. 85-101. 
11
 2('FLWHV(SKUDLP&KDPEHUV¶Cyclopædia; or, an universal dictionary of arts and 
sciences from 1728µCounter-Proof, in Rolling-Press Printing, a Print taken off from 
another fresh printed; which, by being pass'd thro' the Press, gives the Figure of the 
former, but inverted¶ According to André Beguin (1927) DFRXQWHUSURRILVµREWDLQHG
by passing a freshly printed proof and a clean sheet of paper through the press¶
(online).  
12
 The discussion of the family begins on 1974, 10/ 1986b, 4 and continues 
throughout Glas. 
